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ABSTRACT
Current database security research classify four types of controls for the
protection of data in databases: access controls, information flow controls,
inference controls, and cryptographic controls. This paper covers the fourth type
of controls, cryptographic controls in database security that provides security of
data stored in commercial RDBMS like Oracle. The proposed database
encryption scheme is based on TS Block and Stream Ciphers, and is capable of
protecting data at the data element, row, and column levels using both block and
stream encryptions. The design of the scheme's key generation and management
system allows the controls of users' access to encrypted data in a multilevel
fashion thus provide multilevel security. The scheme solves the problem of
mandatory and discretionary access controls in a given organization. The
security of the scheme is based on the fact that no cryptographic keys are stored
in the database system. All encryption and decryption keys are stored securely in
smartcards thus providing minimum cryptographic information to users. The
design of the encryption scheme is based on the provably strong ciphers with
128-bit keys which is currently infeasible to be broken even by exhaustive key
search. Implementation of the scheme has been conducted successfully in Oracle
RDBMS and complements the Oracle encryption security available.
ABSTRAK
Penyelidikan masa kini dalam bidang keselamatan pangkalan data mengelaskan
empat jenis kawalan bagi mengawal keselamatan data iaitu kawalan capaian,
kawalan aliran maklumat, kawalan inferens dan kawalan kriptografi. Kertas ini
menerangkan kawalan jenis keempat iaitu kawalan kriptografi yang dapat
menyediakan keselamatan data bagi suatu sistem pengurusan pangkalan data
hubungan komersial seperti sistem Oracle. Skema pengenkriptan pangkalan data
yang di cadangkan ini adalah berdasarkan sistem-sistem sipher "TS Block" dan
"TS Stream ". Skema ini dapat memberi keselamatan data pada aras unsur data,
baris dan lajur data
menggunakan kaedah pengenkriptan blok dan "stream". Reka bentuk sistem
penjana dan pengurusan kunci kriptografi dapat mengawal pengguna mencapai
data yang telah di enkripkan secara berbilang aras. Ini dapat memberi ciri
keselamatan data berbilang aras (multilevel security). Skema ini mendapat ciri
keselamatannya berdasarkan atas fakta bahawa tiada kunci kriptografi di
simpan dalam sistem pangkalan data tersebut. Oleh itu maklumat kriptografi
yang minimum diberi kepada pengguna iaitu hanya kunci kriptografi mereka
disimpan secara selamat dalam kad-kad pintar. Reka bentuk skema
pengenkriptan ini dibuat menggunakan sistem sipher yang terbukti kuatnya dan
menggunakan kunci sepanjang 128 bit. Pada masa ini, kunci sepanjang ini tidak
mungkin dapat di cari penyelesaiannya walaupun menggunakan kaedah
pencarian kunci secara menyeluruh. Pelaksanaan skema ini dalam sistem
pangkalan data hubungan Oracle telah dibuat dengan berjaya dan ia dapat
melengkapkan lagi sistem keselamatan pengenkriptan Oracle yang tersedia ada.
INTRODUCTION
We are in the age of information warfare. It is not wrong to say that the IRAQ
war is the first information warfare (Azmi 2003) the world have ever seen and
demonstrated by the United States of America. This fact is further supported by
writers and publishers in the international scene and locally, even by our Minister
of Defense Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak who said that knowledge and expertise
in information warfare was crucial for the future development of the Malaysian
armed forces (Sharmini 2003). With the current Internet access capability,
security of information is now everybody's concern. Governments concern for
national safety, corporations concern with the security of their businesses on the
web, and the society would like to secure their personal privacy. At the root of
this problem is the security of .databases where much of the information is stored
digitally and may be accessed 24 x 7 days all year round.
There has been a lot of research work done in the field of database
security. Pernul and Luef (1992) produced a good bibliographical listing of
database security but did not include cryptographic controls and security in
statistical databases. They categorized the work in database security into 14
sections covering research issues in databases, evaluation criteria and standards,
to other works like security monitoring and reference monitors. So what is
database security? Database security is concerned with ensuring the secrecy,
integrity, and availability of data stored in a database (Denning 1988). It
comprises a set of measures, policies, and mechanisms to provide confidentiality,
integrity and availability of data and to combat possible attacks on the system
(threats) from insiders and outsiders, both malicious and accidental (Castano et
al. 1995, Dastjerdi et al. 1996). To provide
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database protection, Denning and Denning (1979) lists four types of controls:
access controls, information flow controls, inference controls, and cryptographic
controls.
Access control in a database is the ability to explicitly enable or restrict in
some way subjects (users, roles, processes) who can access objects (data, stored
procedures, functions; programs) and do something with a computer resource
(e.g. use, change, or view). In an access control system, there is a set of access
policies and rules that all subjects must follow in accessing objects, and a set of
control procedures (security mechanisms) that check the access requests against
the rules before allowing, denying, or modifying the requests, including filtering
of unauthorized data. Bertino et al. (1995) provides three main directions in
access control research: discretionary access control in relational database
management systems (RDBMSS), mandatory access control in RDBMS, and the
development of adequate authorization models for advanced DBMSs. In
discretionary access control (DAC), subjects access objects on the basis of the
subjects' identity and authorization rules. 'Discretionary' means that the
possibility exists for subjects to grant and revoke access rights on some objects.
On the other hand, mandatory access controls (MAC) restrict the access of
subjects to objects on the basis of security labels. Security labeling for subjects
and objects are made of security classes or access classes. An access class
consists of two components: a security/classification levels and a set of
categories. Examples of security/ classification levels are Top Secret (TS), Secret
(S), Confidential (C), and Unclassified (U), where TS > S > C > U ( > is for
dominates). An object's (data or information) security class reflects the sensitivity
of the information contained in the object. A subject's (user) security level, also
referred to as user clearance, reflects the user's trustworthiness not to disclose
sensitive information to users not cleared to see it. Categories for subjects and
objects tend to reflect their application areas or departments, such as Production-
Personnel-Engineering-Administration for industrial environment, and Logistics-
Procurement-Recruitment - Intelligence for defense department. Categories, in
addition to security levels, are used to provide finer grained security
classifications and form the basis for enforcing need-to-know restrictions.
In a multilevel RDBMS, multilevel secure RDBMS (MLSIRDBMS) can
be achieved with either mandatory or discretionary access control policies.
However, MAC is often referred to as multilevel access control and the us
Department of Defense (DoD) mandatory security (or multilevel security)
policies restrict access to classified information to cleared personnel. Therefore,
MAC is always used in the context of MLSIRDBMS in which a multilevel
RDBMS supports data with different security levels (classifications) and users
with different security clearances (Lunt 1992). Multilevel security is needed in
this type of database which contains information in various classifications and
the fact that not all users have clearance for the highest classification of
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data contained in it. This means that a MLSIRDBMS have some multilevel
relations that will appear differently to users with different security clearances,
because not all data are authorized to all users. Table I below illustrates an
example of a multilevel relation.
Information flow controls govern the transmission of information among
accessible objects in the system or ultimately from one user to another. An
information flow occurs when some data in X is read and written into Y. Flow
control policies require admissible flows to be listed or regulated. If information
is transmitted between two objects but the transfer request, on the basis of
admitted flows, is unauthorized then it is said that an information flow violation
has occurred. An information flow policy specifies the channels along which
information is allowed to move. Inference controls are controls that prohibit
users making conclusions from indirect access to data. They are relevant
especially in statistical databases when users can deduce specific information
from querying for summary information. There are three main inference channels
in a system where users can make such deductions: indirect access, correlated
data, and missing data. Statistical attacks can be governed by applying inference
controls such as query controls, random samples, and data perturbation. The
fourth type of controls for database protection is cryptographic controls. Data at-
rest (data stored in databases) or data in-transit (data in the communication
transmissions) are protected by transforming them into an unintelligible state
where only the intended user with the correct secret key is able to understand
(decipher) the message/data. In applying cryptographic controls, the encryption
technique will utilize a secret key (K), e.g.' "A32917E4C64EAA618BED08E-
6A8875640" to transform a sensitive message/data (M) commonly referred to as
the plaintext, e.g. "When to exchange", into its scrambled form (MK) or
commonly referred to as the ciphertext, e.g.
"IDC0220EF27C45B4D51070AD6747753C". In this paper, we consider only the fourth
type of controls, i.e. cryptographic controls, for the security of databases. This
paper is also aimed at providing solutions to the problem of security in
commercial relational databases taking the example of Oracle RDBMS.
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RELATED WORK
A database encryption scheme enhances the security in databases by providing a
framework for the application of cryptographic transformations to data solving
the problems of MAC and DAC. Data can be transformed cryptographically
either at the data element, column, or row levels in a database. Gudes et al.
(1976) gave a formal description for the application of cryptographic
transformation in databases. Davida et al. (1981) first proposed a record oriented
encryption scheme but allows the encryption and decryption of fields within the
record using subkeys. The system is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Davida and Yeh (1982) showed some database operations using cryptographic
relational algebra. Further enhancement to the scheme was done by Omar and
Wells (1983), Cooper et al. (1984), Hwang and Yang (1997), and Lin et al.
(1992). Denning (1983) used the Data Encryption Standard for the encryption
and authentication of fields within a record. Hardjono and Seberry (1989)
proposed a multilevel encryption scheme which allows a hierarchical
organization of keys used to encrypt and decrypt data stored in databases. The
scheme uses the same method as the RSA cryptosystem and was implemented
using UNIFY DBMS (Hardjono et al. 1990). He and Wang (2001) conducted a
study on how to integrate modem cryptography technology into a RDBMS to
solve some major security problems. They focus their effort on how to enhance
the access control mechanism to make user management more secure and close
some major security holes of current RDBMSs, and how to support database
encryption.
ORACLE SECURITY
Oracle database security entails permitting or denying user actions on the
database and the objects within it. Oracle uses schemas and security domains to
controtaccess to data and to restrict the use of various database resources. A
schema is a named collection of objects, such as tables, views, clusters,
procedures, and packages. A user's security domain include user's authentication
method, the default and temporary tablespaces, tablespaces accessible to the user,
the user's resource limit profile, and the privileges, roles, and security policies
that provide the user with appropriate access to schema objects needed to
perform database operations. Oracle provides comprehensive discretionary
access control. Oracle Advanced Security is a bundle of network security
features such as data encryption and integrity for all network protocols into the
Oracle database, supports third-party authentication, authorization, and single
sign-on services, and integrates a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Oracle Virtual
Private Database (VPD) provides row-level access control and supports the
Oracle Label Security. The latter implements label-based access control policies
mediating access to rows in database tables based on a label contained in the row,
a label associated with each
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database session, and Oracle Label Security privileges assigned to the session.
Database encryptionin Oracleis provided by DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT.
The toolkit is a built-in PL/SQL package to encrypt and decrypt stored data. It
supports bulk data encryption using the algorithms Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and triple DES (3DES) in both two and three key modes. Although the
toolkit supports the MDS cryptographic hash algorithm for data integrity and a
random number generator for generating secure encryption keys, database users
are required to device their own key management system.
OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
Our approach is novel and simple in the sense it does not utilize any complex
mathematical equations in deriving its cryptographic keys for multilevel access
controls. We designed and implemented a new database encryption scheme based
on the block cipher built by Tuan Sabri (2000), which is referred to as TS Block
Cipher throughout this paper. Our database encryption scheme is highly suitable
and easily implemented in any commercial relational DBMS such as Oracle" and
SQL Server". The scheme guarantees the integrity of data in the database, and
provides data confidentiality accessible only by authorized database users with
appropriate cryptographic keys. This multilevel database encryption scheme is
based on symmetric cryptography which means that the key used to decrypt is
the same as the one used to encrypt it. All users' cryptographic keys are securely
stored in smartcards external to the database management systems and are read-
in during the encryption and decryption process. In this process, users'
cryptographic keys are utilized to generate on-the-fly "session keys" which are
finally used to encrypt or decrypt the database data. The session keys, though are
actually used in the encryption-decryption process, are just temporary keys and
are not stored anywhere in the system. They are created, used, and destroyed.
Before we describe fully the entire database encryption scheme, we introduce the
basic concept involved in using TS Block Cipher as the main building block in
the whole scheme. TS Block Cipher is used extensively in the scheme's
cryptographic key derivatives and achieved the multilevel security requirements
in the system. Unlike TS Block Cipher, TS Stream Ciphers are used only in the
encryption and decryption of data in the database.
FOUNDATIONS TO THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUE USED
This section describes the basic building blocks in the design of the proposed
database encryption scheme. The scheme is based on the cryptographic work
done by Tuan Sabri in his Ph.D. research namely the works on the new design of
block and stream cipher encryption algorithms for data security. In
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this section, we also describe the important concept of TS Block Cipher before
explaining the cryptographic primitives of the scheme and some enhancements
made for database application purposes.
TS BLOCK CIPHER
A block cipher transforms a string of input bits of fixed length (the input block)
into a string of output bits of fixed length (the output block). With the current
state of development in computer technology, modem cipher systems should be
able to withstand exhaustive keysearch at least up to 264• What this means is that
the cryptographic strength of a cipher system should be able to withstand the risk
of finding its correct key through searching all of its possible keys and the
minimum combination of this possible keys must be 264• A block cipher is totally
broken if a key can be found. TS Block Cipher was designed with considerations
that surpassed many of the high security requirements including a 128-bit
symmetric block cipher (128 bits block size), and the key length of 128-bits in
which exhaustive keysearch of 2128 is currently infeasible. The TS Block Cipher
also passed the statistical test in the design of a good cipher system. The reader is
encouraged to refer to Tuan Sabri (2000) Ph.D; work for more detail explanation.
The primary use of TS Block Cipher in the proposed database encryption scheme
is in its key generation, management, and distribution (KGMD) subsystem.
Based on the high security features in the basic design of TS Block Cipher, and
the fact it accepts a variable called the Initialization Vector (IV) that "influence"
the output of the other input variable, renders the TS Block Cipher suitable for
KGMD. This is shown graphically in Figure 1. The figure illustrates the
capability of TS Block Cipher in generating a subordinate's master key (MK)
from hislher superior MK with the use of the Superior's IV. The Superior's IV
can be any value or property taken from the Superior, for example usemame, user
jd, etc. The initialization vector is the parameter value that is used to set the
initial state of the cipher system. Therefore, the use of the same IV with the same
input, e.g. the Superior's MK, will produce the same subordinate's MK all the
time.
The Superior MK with hislher appropriate IV can produce hislher subordinate's
MK, and the subordinate's MK with hislher appropriate IV can in tum produce
hislher sub-subordinate's MK, and so on. This provides the solution to the
problem of access controls in a hierarchy achieving the multilevel security
requirement in the scheme.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Figure 2 illustrates the cryptographic primitives for the proposed database
encryption scheme. We notice there are three main sections: Input Process,
Encryption-Decryption Process, and Key Generation Process. In the example
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shown, the input to the system is "Uni Tek Malaysia" comprising of 16 ASCII
characters including 2 blank characters. The input is limited to 16 in this example
because that is the maximum the Block Cipher can process in a block. For input
data longer than 16 characters, the process will be looped 16 characters a time,
and blanks will be padded in the last loop to make it 16 characters also. For this
input to be encrypted, cryptographic keys need to be generated. In the Key
Generation Process section, we notice there are two types of random key
generator: a 128-bit key generator, and a 256-bit key generator. These random
key generators will generate the l28-bit keys (32 hex characters) for use in the
Encryption-Decryption (E-O) process by the TS Block Cipher, and the 256-bit
keys (64 hex characters) by the TS Stream Ciphers.
However, in the proposed database encryption scheme, session keys are
in fact being used in the E-O process. This is not so obviously shown in the
figure. By looking closely in the Key Generation Process section, there is a sub-
section called Pre- I Session Key Generator.
By pressing the button "BC Hex Encryption", a 32-hex character key is
produced. This key is commonly referred as a "Pre-Session Key" in the case of
TS Stream Cipher and a "Session Key" when TS Block Cipher is used. The
production of Pre-Session and Session keys require two types of input. The first
input type is the hashed value from the Input Process, vis-a-vis, "Uni Tek
Malaysia" using the hash function MOS. This hash value is reflective of the Data
IV (will be explained in the section on Description of Our Database Encryption
Scheme). The second type of input is the user's cryptographic key. Both of these
types of input will go into the TS Block Cipher algorithm to produce the session
keys. It is worth mentioning that two session keys (in fact are Pre-Session keys)
are concatenated to produce a 64-hex key (256bits) required by TS Stream
Cipher.
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\ With the proper production of session keys using appropriate
cryptographic keys, we discuss next the Encryption-Decryption process. The
basic encryption and decryption capability of the proposed database encryption
scheme has three algorithmic options for users to choose. These cryptographic
algorithms are proprietary algorithms and are based on symmetric cryptography.
In each of the algorithms, users can further choose the encryption mode. The
input string, "Uni Tek Malaysia" is what we refer to as the plaintext or the raw
form of the data to be encrypted. Once the data has been encrypted, it will be
transformed into a scrambled format which we term as the ciphertext which is in
an unintelligible state. The encryption mode here then is the option of choosing
the state of the ciphertext output to be either in Base64 or Hexadecimal (Base16)
representations. Base64 has two advantages over Hexadecimal representation,
that is, it saves storage space and it is more transportable between different
computer systems.
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In the first encryption algorithm option users may choose the TS Block
Cipher. Encryption using this cipher will provide a high degree of accuracy since
block ciphers, by their very nature of design has low noise and high degree of
error propagation. It is suitable for encrypting monetary and numeric fields
which require high degree of accuracy. It is not suitable for encrypting
voluminous amount of data because it processes 16 bytes per block of data at a
time and is much slower than stream ciphers. The second and third options of
encryption involved the use of TS Stream Cipher algorithm. The original TS
Stream Cipher was designed using eight Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR)
for the secure transmission of encrypted messages. It has been proven in Tuan
Sabri's Ph.D. research work that this design is highly secure. However, for the
purpose of bulk data encryption and fast response time such as in database
applications, a slight modification to this design was made. The alternative
solution is to have only four LFSR instead of eight with no compromise in
security. The security of the 4LFSR is explained in greater detail in the section
on Security of the Proposed Database Encryption Scheme. An empirical study on
the speed and performance of various encryption algorithms including TS Stream
and Block ciphers will be treated in a future work. Based on our limited
observation in the implementation of the scheme showed there is a great
difference in throughput between the 8LFSR and the 4LFSR. The latter is much
faster compared to the former.
TS STREAM CIPHER ENHANCEMENT
The original TS Stream Cipher was designed for used in the secure transmission
of information and digital communications. However, in the application of
security in databases where there will be voluminous amount of data to be
encrypted, we need to minimize or possibly zerorized encryption patterns in the
data stored in databases. This will increase the security in which cryptographic
attacks based on pattern matching will be safeguarded. To achieve this security
objective, the TS Stream Cipher was modified so that bulk encryption of similar
data in databases will not produce obvious patterns that may expose it to
cryptanalytic attacks. Figure 3 shows the encryption of similar data input having
four different output ciphertext thus showing no pattern matching or correlation
between the input and the output. This is true for any of the encryption mode and
algorithm chosen.
DESCRIPTI.ON OF OUR DATABASE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The proposed database encryption scheme is composed of two sub-schemes: the
first is the encryption scheme based on TS Stream Cipher algorithm; and the
second is the encryption scheme based on TS Block Cipher algorithm. The
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FIGURE 3. TS Stream Cipher enhancement
main difference between the two is that the former involves the generation of
pre- and session keys while the later requires only the generation of session keys.
As mentioned in the section on Overview of Approach, the encryption scheme is
based on symmetric cryptography and our solutions allow the encryption and
decryption of data at all levels, that is at the individual data element level, at the
column/attribute or domain level, and also at the row or tuple level using both the
stream and block ciphers. With this kind of flexibility, the challenge in managing
the encryption and decryption processes is to ensure no double encryption of data
happens. How the encryption system keep tracks of fields that have been
encrypted so as to ensure no reencryption of data will be covered in future work.
TS STREAM CIPHER ENCRYPTION SUB-SCHEME
The IS. Stream Cipher sub-scheme allows the encryption and decryption of data
in the database using TS Stream Cipher algorithm. Figure 4 illustrates the inner
workings of the encryption engine for TS Stream Cipher sub-scheme. The
encryption engine can be viewed at three levels. Level I consist of the encryption
(light shaded) and decryption (dark shaded) regions, that is, the generation of the
required pre- and session keys for the encryption and decryption processes,
respectively. Refer to the section on Pre-and Session Keys in the Proposed
Database Encryption Scheme for detailed explanation. Level II or the blue region
is the stage where data from the database are fed into the encryption algorithm to
be encrypted or decrypted, depending on the process stage. During encryption,
plaintext data (not encrypted or raw data) are read from the database and with the
appropriate session key generated beforehand, the data will be transformed into
an unreadable format by the stream cipher before finally stored securely in the
DBMS. When an authorized
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user with the appropriate security clearance would like to read this encrypted
data and the data class allows him to read it, the data will be fed into the
deciphering program. The program then, using the same session key as produced
during the encryption process, will transform the data into its original plaintext
state before presenting it to the user by the database system. Level III shows the
underlying database engine that allows only authorized access to the database
data by cleared users based on the discretionary access control rules of the
RDBMS. The ability to generate appropriate session keys from User Master
Keys as explained in Level I above are reflective of the Mandatory Access
Control policy of the scheme.
FIGURE 4. The TS Stream Cipher Database Encryption sub-scheme
TS BLOCK CIPHER ENCRYPTION SUB-SCHEME
Similar to the explanation in the previous section, the TS Block Cipher
encryption sub-scheme requires only the generation of session keys. This is
clearly shown in Figure 5. The encryption and decryption capability of this
scheme is similar to the TS Stream Cipher encryption sub-scheme described
above. Though the sub-scheme encryption process is slower compared to the TS
Stream Cipher, it is more suitable for numeric or monetary fields that require
high accuracy. This is true between Block and Stream Ciphers by their nature of
design.
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FIGURE 5. The TS Block Cipher Database Encryption sub-scheme
PRE-AND SESSION KEYS IN THE PROPOSED DATABASE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
Based- on the characteristics and requirements of strong cipher design, encryption
using TS Stream Cipher requires 256-bit keys and l28-bit keys for the TS Block
Cipher. The database encryption scheme is based on the TS Block Cipher for its
cryptographic keys which are 128-bit long. Therefore, TS Stream Cipher encryption
requires two Pre-Session Keys which are concatenated to produce the 256-bit
Session Key. This is achieved by dividing the data IV into two or by getting two
related information regarding the data to be encrypted. These two parts of the Data
IV are what we termed as the Left IV (LIV) and the Right IV (RIV).
KEY GENERATION, MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
The driving subsystem for the database encryption scheme is its Key Generation,
Management, and Distribution (KGMD) system. Figure 6 shows the KGMD system.
The system produces two types of key: Master Key (MK) and Shared Key (SK).
MKs are used for the MAC mechanism in a multilevel access mode while the SKs
are for special access privileges and may consists of DAC and MAC
implementations at various user levels, that is, at Level 0 through Level n in the
users' organization hierarchy. It is discretionary in the
85
sense the owner may authorize other users to view hislher encrypted data by
giving them a copy of the key. As can be seen from Figure 6, lower ranking MKs
can be generated by the higher ranking MK holders. In the MK key generation
process, users IVs are hashed using the MD5 hashing function. For SK key
generation, the data class is taken as the IV. Data can be classified according to
user requirements and may consist of security levels, compartments, and groups
or combination of these. As have been mentioned earlier, all cryptographic keys
are stored securely in medium like smartcards. Therefore, the KGMD system can
be independent from the database encryption scheme for the generation,
management, storage, and distribution of. both types of keys. The organization
may elect to place the full trust to a security manager for organization wide key
generation, management, and distributions.
SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED DATABASE ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The scheme is based on TS cryptosystem. It has been proven that both the TS
Block and Stream Ciphers were designed with high security meeting the set of
operating conditions specified. The TS Block Cipher was designed with a 128-bit
block size that passed the four statistical tests for Block Cipher local randomness
developed by the Information Security Group of the Royal Holloway University
of London. The TS Stream Cipher was designed with large linear complexity,
large number of keys, resistant to known attacks, and passed all the statistical
tests for stream ciphers.
The design of the database encryption scheme is such that all
cryptographic keys are kept outside the system. There is minimum crypto
information given to users that is they have their encryption and decryption keys
in their smartcards. Therefore, the security of these keys is very much dependent
on the secure storage of them in smartcards or other medium used. There is,
however, the issue of user security protecting their own keys or collaborating
with others. But this is a separate issue and should be dealt with accordingly. In
this scheme, accessing data in the database is through the data IVs with
appropriate cryptographic keys. This is similar to accessing the database via
plaintext form; however, future work will verify the effectiveness of processing
data using data IVs. In terms of security, all data IVs are stored in their hashed
form.
As mentioned above, there is a separate issue of user security. In the
event user keys are compromised, the risks and threats to the security of the
database depends much on the status and location of the user(s) involved.
In principle, the higher the user is in the key hierarchy, the greater the risk
and the amount of re-encryption needed is more. A new set of keys can be
generated and given to the user(s) involved but the encrypted data need to be
decrypted and re-encrypted with the new set of keys. This can be done
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FIGURE 6. Key generation, management & distribution
offline or with a disruption in the system which is not desirable. Key recovery is
easily done basically by re-generating through the KGMD system to replace non-
functioning or destroyed keys. Key recovery for all user level keys can be
derived from the system keys. Some system shared keys are backup keys for
users. If the security procedure requires periodic key changes, new sets of keys
can be generated and distributed manually by running the KGMD system. Data
in the database can be re-encrypted with these new keys in the background using
the backup or copy version in offline mode.
CONLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a new database encryption scheme that is secure
and suitable for implementation in a commercial RDBMS like Oracle. Our
scheme allows the encryption of data at all levels including the data
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elements, rows, and columns. The issuance of users' master keys and shared keys
allows the enforcement of multilevel access controls and other access control
policies required by organizations including discretionary and special cases.
Since the scheme has limited implementation, more work need to be done to
evaluate the security mechanism, and the final database performance with the
scheme in place. Pernul (1995) provides some basis for the evaluation and
comparison of information security. Dietrich et al. (1992) introduced the
practitioner's approach to performance benchmarks and measurements for
centralized databases. A benchmarking methodology for Multilevel Secure
DBMS is given by Schlipper et al. (1992).
Currently, the scheme is suitable only for closed networks because of the
problem with key transfer between the client and the database server. Future
work will be the implementation of a public key system that will allow secure
exchange of our symmetric keys for open networks and Internet accesses. With
this capability, the scheme can be expanded into a well distributed database
systems which the key management is capable of providing distinct key
identification for each database server for controlled access.
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